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Abstract
Voting is a general method for preference aggrega-
tion in multiagent settings, but seminal results have
shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are
manipulable. One could try to avoid manipula-
tion by using voting protocols where determining
a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally.
A number of recent papers study the complexity
of manipulating existing protocols. This paper is
the first work to take the next step of designing
new protocols that are especially hard to manip-
ulate. Rather than designing these new protocols
from scratch, we instead show how to tweak ex-
isting protocols to make manipulation hard, while
leaving much of the original nature of the protocol
intact. The tweak studied consists of adding one
elimination preround to the election. Surprisingly,
this extremely simple and universal tweak makes
typical protocols hard to manipulate! The proto-
cols become NP-hard, #P-hard, or PSPACE-hard
to manipulate, depending on whether the sched-
ule of the preround is determined before the votes
are collected, after the votes are collected, or the
scheduling and the vote collecting are interleaved,
respectively. We prove general sufficient condi-
tions on the protocols for this tweak to introduce
the hardness, and show that the most common vot-
ing protocols satisfy those conditions. These are
the first results in voting settings where manipula-
tion is in a higher complexity class than NP (pre-
suming PSPACE 6= NP).
1 Introduction
Often, a group of agents has to make a common deci-
sion, yet they have different preferences about which
decision is made. Thus, it is of central importance to
be able to aggregate the preferences, that is, to make
a socially desirable decision as to which candidate is
chosen from a set of candidates. Such candidates could
∗The material in this paper is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under CAREER Award IRI-9703122,
Grant IIS-9800994, ITR IIS-0081246, and ITR IIS-0121678.
be potential presidents, joint plans, allocations of goods
or resources, etc. Voting is the most general preference
aggregation scheme, and has been used in several multiagent
decision making problems in AI, such as collaborative
filtering (e.g. [Pennock et al., 2000]) and planning among
automated agents (e.g. [Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1991;
Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1993]).
A key problem voting mechanisms are confronted with is
that of manipulation by the voters. An agent is said to vote
strategically when it does not rank the alternatives accord-
ing to its true preferences, but differently so as to manipulate
the outcome to be more favorable to the agent. For exam-
ple, if an agent prefers Nader to Gore to Bush, but knows that
Nader has too few other supporters to win, while Gore and
Bush are close to each other, the agent would be better off by
declaring Gore as its top candidate. Manipulation is an unde-
sirable phenomenon. For one, because social choice schemes
are tailored to aggregate preferences in a socially desirable
way, and if the agents reveal their preferences insincerely, a
socially undesirable candidate may be chosen.
A seminal negative result, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite the-
orem, shows that if there are three or more candidates,
then in any nondictatorial voting scheme, there are pref-
erences under which an agent is better off voting strategi-
cally [Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975]. (A voting scheme
is called dictatorial if one of the voters dictates the social
choice no matter how the others vote). In automated group
decision making where the voters are software agents, the
manipulability of protocols is even more problematic, for at
least two reasons. First, the algorithms they use to decide how
to vote must be coded explicitly. Given that the voting algo-
rithm needs to be designed only once (by an expert), and can
be copied to large numbers of agents (even ones represent-
ing unsophisticated human voters), it is likely that rational
strategic voting will increasingly become an issue, unmud-
died by irrationality, emotions, etc. Second, software agents
have more computational power and are more likely to find
effective manipulations.
We take the following tack toward avoiding manipulation:
ensuring that finding a beneficial manipulation is so hard
computationally that it is unlikely that voters will be able to
manipulate. So, unlike in most of computer science, here
high computational complexity is a desirable property. The
harder it is to manipulate, the better.
Prior work on the complexity of manipulating elections
has focused on existing protocols [Bartholdi et al., 1989;
Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002a].
This paper is the first to take the next step of designing
new protocols that are especially hard to manipulate. Rather
than designing these protocols from scratch, we show how to
tweak existing protocols to make manipulation computation-
ally much more difficult, while leaving much of the original
nature of the protocol intact, for the following reasons:
• Results on the computational complexity induced by a
tweak typically apply to a large family of protocols.
• Many of the original protocol’s nice theoretical proper-
ties are preserved by the tweak.
• In practice, it will be much easier to replace a currently
used protocol with a tweaked version of it, than with an
altogether new protocol.
The type of tweak we study in this paper is the follow-
ing. All the candidates are paired in a preround; of each pair
of candidates, only the winner of their pairwise election sur-
vives. (The winner of the pairwise election between two can-
didates is the candidate that is ranked above the other more
often in the votes.) After the preround, the original protocol
is executed on the remaining candidates. The schedule of the
preround (i.e., who faces who) can be determined before the
votes are collected; after the votes are collected; or while the
votes are collected (the processes are interleaved). We study
these three cases in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 1
2 Definitions
2.1 Elections and voting protocols
An election consists of a set of candidates C; a set of voters
V ; and a protocol for deciding on a winner w ∈ C given all
the voters’ votes. (Here, a vote is a total ordering of the candi-
dates.) A deterministic protocol is a function from the set of
all combinations of votes to C. (All our results hold even for
unweighted voters, so in this paper this function will always
treat the voters symmetrically.) A randomized protocol is a
function from the set of all combinations of votes to proba-
bility distributions over C. An interleaved protocol is a pro-
cedure for alternating between collecting parts of the voters’
votes (e.g. whether they prefer candidate a to candidate b)
and drawing and publishing random variables (such as parts
of the schedule for an election), together with a function from
the set of all combinations of votes and random variables to
1The high complexity results obtained in this paper are depen-
dent on the number of candidates growing. This places them in
line with all the early results in this area [Bartholdi et al., 1989;
Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991], but in contrast with more recent re-
sults [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002a] that show high complexity of
manipulation with a constant number of candidates for some pro-
tocols. Having high complexity of manipulation occur with a con-
stant number of candidates already is certainly preferable to having
it occur only with a growing number. On the other hand, unlike in
that paper, the results here hold even when the voters all have equal
weight, and even when manipulation is attempted by an individual
rather than a coalition, making the results in this paper stronger in
that sense, so there is a tradeoff.
C. (Collecting only parts of the voters’ preferences is also
known as elicitation.)
The standard definitions of most voting protocols allow for
the possibility of ties between candidates, in which case a tie-
breaking rule is required to fully specify the protocol. All our
results hold for any tie-breaking rule, so we do not need to
specify such rules here.
In this paper we apply our technique to the most common
voting protocols (in these definitions, whenever points are de-
fined, the candidate with the most points wins):
• Plurality. A candidate receives 1 point for every voter
that ranks it first. (Thus, the voters effectively only vote
for one candidate.)
• Borda. For each voter, a candidate receivesm−1 points
if it is the voter’s top choice, m − 2 if it is the second
choice, ..., 0 if it is the last.
• Maximin. A candidate’s score in a pairwise election is
the number of voters that prefer it over the opponent. A
candidate’s number of points is the lowest score it gets
in any pairwise election.
• Single Transferable Vote (STV). The winner determina-
tion process proceeds in rounds. In each round, a candi-
date’s score is the number of voters that rank it highest
among the remaining candidates, and the candidate with
the lowest score drops out. The last remaining candidate
wins. (A vote ‘”transfers” from its top remaining can-
didate to the next highest remaining candidate when the
former drops out.)
2.2 Preround
The tweaks we study in this paper all involve the addition of
a preround. We will now define how this works.
Definition 1 Given a protocol P , the new protocol obtained
by adding a preround to it proceeds as follows:
1. The candidates are paired. If there is an odd number of
candidates, one candidate gets a bye.
2. In each pairing of two candidates, the candidate losing
the pairwise election between the two is eliminated. A
candidate with a bye is never eliminated.
3. On the remaining candidates, P is executed to produce
a winner. For this, the implicit votes over the remaining
candidates are used. (For example, if a voter voted a ≻
b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e, and b and c were eliminated, the voter’s
implicit vote is a ≻ d ≻ e.)
The pairing of the candidates is also known as the schedule
for the preround. If the schedule is decided and published be-
fore the votes are collected, we have a deterministic preround
(DPRE), and the resulting protocol is called DPRE+P . If
the schedule is drawn completely randomly after the votes are
collected, we have a randomized preround (RPRE), and the
resulting protocol is called RPRE + P . Finally, if the votes
are elicited incrementally, and this elicitation process is in-
terleaved with the scheduling-and-publishing process (which
is again done randomly), as described in detail in Section 6,
we have an interleaved preround (IPRE), and the resulting
protocol is called IPRE + P .
2.3 Manipulation
We now define the computational problem of manipulation.
Because all our hardness results hold even when the voters
are unweighted, only a single voter is trying to manipulate,
and all the other voters’ votes are known to the manipulator,
we will only define this simple setting here. Any hardness
results in this simple setting immediately imply hardness in
all more general settings.
Definition 2 (CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION)
We are given a protocol P , a candidate set C, a preferred
candidate p, and a set of votes S corresponding to all the
other voters’ votes. The manipulator has yet to decide on
its vote, and wants to make p win. Then the constructive
manipulation question is:
• (For deterministic protocols) Can the manipulator cast
its vote to make p win under P?
• (For randomized protocols) Can the manipulator cast its
vote to make the probability of p winning under P at
least some given k ∈ [0, 1]?
• (For interleaved protocols) Given the initial random
choices (if any) by the protocol, is there a contingency
plan (based on the random decisions the protocol takes
between eliciting parts of the votes) for the manipula-
tor to answer the queries to make the probability of p
winning under P at least some given k ∈ [0, 1]?
3 Complexity of manipulating untweaked
protocols
In this section, we briefly review the complexity of
manipulating voting protocols, as a benchmark for our
results. CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is in P
for the Plurality, Borda, and Maximin voting proto-
cols [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. The only voting protocol for
which CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is known to be
NP-hard is the STV protocol [Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991].2
4 NP-hardness when scheduling precedes
voting
In this section, we examine the complexity induced by the
preround when the voters know the schedule before they vote.
4.1 A sufficient condition for NP-hardness
We present a sufficient condition under which adding a pre-
round with a preannounced schedule makes manipulation
NP-hard. The condition can be thought of as an NP-hardness
reduction template. If it is possible to reduce an arbitrary SAT
instance to a set of votes satisfying certain properties under
the given voting protocol, that protocol—with a preround—
is NP-hard to manipulate.
Theorem 1 Given a voting protocolP , suppose that it is pos-
sible, for any Boolean formula φ in conjunctive normal form
2CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is NP-hard also for the
Second Order Copeland protocol [Bartholdi et al., 1989], but the
hardness is driven solely by the tie-breaking rule.
(i.e., a SAT instance), to construct in polynomial time a set
of votes over a candidate set containing at least {p} ∪ CL
where CL = {cl : l ∈ L} (L is the set of literals {+v : v ∈
V } ∪ {−v : v ∈ V }, where V is the set of variables used in
φ), with the following properties:
• (Property 1a) If we remove, for each v ∈ V , one of
c+v and c−v, p would win an election under protocol P
against the remaining candidates if and only if for every
clause k ∈ K (where K is the set of clauses in φ), there
is some l ∈ L such that cl has not been removed, and l
occurs in k. This should hold even if a single arbitrary
vote is added.
• (Property 1b) For any v ∈ V , c+v and c−v are tied in
their pairwise election after these votes.
Then CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION in DPRE + P is
NP-hard (and NP-complete if P is deterministic and can be
executed in polynomial time).
Proof: Consider the following election under DPRE + P .
Let the candidate set be the set of all candidates occurring
in the votes constructed from φ (the ”original candidates”),
plus one dummy candidate for each of the original candidates
besides those in CL. To each of the constructed votes, add
all the dummy candidates at the bottom; let the resulting set
of votes be the set of the nonmanipulators’ votes. A single
manipulator’s vote is yet to be added. Let the schedule for
the preround be as follows: for each v, c+v and c−v face
each other in the preround; and every other original candidate
faces (and, because of the dummy candidates’ position in the
votes, defeats) a dummy candidate. Thus, the set of candi-
dates that make it through the preround consists of, for each
v ∈ V , one of c+v and c−v; and all the other original candi-
dates. The manipulator’s vote will decide the winner of every
c+v vs. c−v match-up, because by property 1b, all these pair-
wise elections are currently tied. Moreover, it is easy to see
that the manipulator can decide the winner of each of these
match-ups independently of how it decides the winners of the
other match-ups. Thus, we can think of this as the manipu-
lator giving the variables truth-values: v is set to true if c+v
survives, and to false if c−v survives. By property 1a it then
follows that p wins if and only if the manipulator’s assign-
ment satisfies all the clauses, i.e. is a solution to the SAT
instance. Hence there is a successful constructive manipu-
lation if and only if there is a solution to the SAT instance,
and it follows that CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION in
DPRE+P is NP-hard. (It is also in NP if P is deterministic
and can be executed in polynomial time, because in this case,
given a vote for the manipulator, it can be verified in polyno-
mial time whether this vote makes p win).
4.2 Examples
We now show how to apply Theorem 1 to the well-known
protocols we discussed, thus showing that each of these
protocols—with a preround—is NP-hard to manipulate.
Theorem 2 There exists a reduction that satisfies properties
1a and 1b of Theorem 1 under the Plurality protocol.
When it does not matter for our proofs whether a given vote
is a ≻ b ≻ c or b ≻ a ≻ c, we write {a, b} ≻ c.
Proof: Given the formula φ, let the candidate set be the min-
imally required candidates {p}∪CL, plus a set of candidates
corresponding to the set of clauses K of φ, CK = {ck : k ∈
K}. Then, let the set of votes be as follows: 4|K| + 2 votes
ranking the candidates p ≻ CL ≻ CK ; for each k ∈ K , 4|K|
votes ranking the candidates ck ≻ {ccl ∈ CK : cl 6= k} ≻
CL ≻ p; and for each k ∈ K , 4 votes ranking the candidates
{cl ∈ CL : l ∈ k} ≻ ck ≻ {cl ∈ CL : l /∈ k} ≻ {ccl ∈
CK : cl 6= k} ≻ p. Additionally, we require that these votes
are such that after counting them, for each v ∈ V , c+v and
c−v are tied in their pairwise election, so that property 1b is
satisfied. (This is possible because the total number of votes
is even, and the majority of the votes do not yet have any re-
strictions on the order of the CL.) We now show property 1a
is satisfied. We first observe that regardless of which of the
candidates corresponding to literals are removed, p will get
4|K| + 2 votes. Now, if for some k ∈ K , all the candidates
cl with l ∈ L, l ∈ k are removed, then ck will get at least
4|K| + 4 votes and p will not win. On the other hand, if for
each k ∈ K , at least one candidate cl with l ∈ k remains,
then each of the ck will get precisely 4|K| votes. Because
each remaining cl can get at most 4|K| votes as well, p will
win. In both cases there is a ”margin” of at least 2, so a sin-
gle additional vote will not change this. Thus, property 1a is
satisfied.
Theorem 3 There exists a reduction that satisfies properties
1a and 1b of Theorem 1 under the Borda protocol.
Proof: Given the formula φ, let the candidate set be the min-
imally required candidates {p} ∪ CL; plus a set of candi-
dates corresponding to the set of clauses K of φ, CK =
{ck : k ∈ K}, which we order in some arbitrary way
to get {c1, . . . , c|K|}. Let M be the total number of can-
didates this defines. Then, let the set of votes be as fol-
lows: for every ci ∈ CK , 4M votes ranking the candidates
ci+1 ≻ ci+2 ≻ . . . ≻ c|K| ≻ p ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻
ci−1 ≻ {cl ∈ CL : l ∈ ci} ≻ ci ≻ {cl ∈ L : l /∈ ci};
(here, the slight abuse of notation l ∈ ci means that l oc-
curs in the clause corresponding to ci;) 4M votes ranking the
candidates c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ c|K| ≻ p ≻ CL; one vote
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ c|K| ≻ CL ≻ p; one vote c|K| ≻ c|K|−1 ≻
. . . ≻ c1 ≻ CL ≻ p; and finally, 4|K|M votes ranking the
candidates p ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ cn ≻ CL, and 4|K|M
votes ranking the candidates cn ≻ cn−1 ≻ . . . c1 ≻ p ≻ CL.
Additionally, we require that these votes are such that after
counting them, for each v ∈ V , c+v and c−v are tied in their
pairwise election, so that property 1b is satisfied. (This is
possible because the total number of votes is even, and the
majority of the votes do not yet have any restrictions on the
order of the cl.) We now show property 1a is satisfied. It is
easy to see that none of the cl can win, regardless of which of
them are removed. Thus, we only need to consider the ci and
p. The last 8|K|M votes will have no net effect on the rela-
tive scores of these candidates, so we need not consider these
here. After the first 4(|K| + 1)M votes, any ck for which
all the cl with l ∈ k have been removed will be tied with p,
and any other ck will be at least 4M points behind p. Finally,
from the last remaining two votes, any ck (k ∈ K) will gain
2M − 2|V | − |K| − 1 points on p. It follows that p wins if
and only if for every clause k ∈ K , there is some l ∈ L with
l ∈ k such that cl has not been removed. In both cases there
is a ”margin” of at least M−|V | points, so a single additional
vote will not change this. Thus, property 1a is satisfied.
Theorem 4 There exists a reduction that satisfies properties
1a and 1b of Theorem 1 under the Maximin protocol.
Proof: Given the formula φ, let the candidate set be the min-
imally required candidates {p}∪CL, plus a set of candidates
corresponding to the set of clauses K of φ, CK = {ck :
k ∈ K}. Then, let the set of votes be as follows: 8|K| votes
ranking the candidates p ≻ CL ≻ CK , 8|K| votes rank-
ing the candidates CL ≻ CK ≻ p, and 8|K| votes ranking
the candidates CK ≻ p ≻ CL; 4|K| votes ranking the can-
didates CL ≻ p ≻ CK , 4|K| votes ranking the candidates
CK ≻ CL ≻ p, and, for each k ∈ K , 4 votes ranking the
candidates p ≻ {ccl ∈ CK : cl 6= k} ≻ {cl ∈ CL : l ∈ k} ≻
ck ≻ {cl ∈ CL : l /∈ k}; and finally, 2 votes ranking the can-
didates p ≻ CK ≻ CL, and 2 votes ranking the candidates
CK ≻ p ≻ CL. Additionally, we require that these votes
are such that after counting them, for each v ∈ V , c+v and
c−v are tied in their pairwise election, so that property 1b is
satisfied. (This is possible because the total number of votes
is even, and the majority of the votes do not yet have any
restrictions on the order of the cl.) We now show property
1a is satisfied. Regardless of which of the candidates corre-
sponding to literals are removed, p’s worst score in a pairwise
election is against any of the ck, namely 16|K|+ 2. Any ck
for which all the cl with l ∈ k have been removed will get its
worst pairwise election score against any of the CL, namely
16|K| + 4. Finally, any other ck will get its worst pairwise
election score against one of the cl with l ∈ k, namely, 16|K|.
It follows that p wins if and only if for every clause k ∈ K ,
there is some l ∈ k such that cl has not been removed. In both
cases there is a ”margin” of at least 2, so a single additional
vote will not change this. Thus, property 1a is satisfied.
Theorem 5 There exists a reduction that satisfies properties
1a and 1b of Theorem 1 under the STV protocol.
Proof: We omit the proof due to limited space.
Theorem 6 In any of DPRE + Plurality, DPRE +
Borda, DPRE + Maximin, and DPRE + STV 3 ,
CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is NP-complete.
Proof: NP-hardness is immediate from the previous theo-
rems. The problem is in NP because these protocols can be
3The NP-completeness of manipulating DPRE + STV is, in
itself, not that interesting, because STV is already NP-hard to ma-
nipulate without the preround as we discussed. Nevertheless, our
method highlights a different aspect of the NP-hardness of manip-
ulating DPRE + STV . We build on this reduction later to prove
PSPACE-hardness of manipulating STV with a preround when the
scheduling of the preround is interleaved with the vote elicitation.
executed in polynomial time.
In the next sections, we will raise the bar and bring
the problem of manipulating elections to higher complexity
classes by abandoning the assumption that the schedule for
the preround should be known in advance.
5 #P-hardness when voting precedes
scheduling
In this section, we will examine the complexity induced by
the preround when the schedule is drawn completely (uni-
formly) randomly after all the votes have been collected.
5.1 A sufficient condition for #P-hardness
We present a sufficient condition for a voting protocol to be-
come #P-hard4 to manipulate in this setting. Again, this con-
dition can be thought of as a reduction template. If it is possi-
ble to reduce an arbitrary PERMANENT instance to a set of
votes satisfying certain properties under the given voting pro-
tocol, that protocol is #P-hard to manipulate when a random-
ized preround is added to it. (In the PERMANENT problem,
we are given a bipartite graph B with the same number of
vertices k in both parts, and are asked how many matchings
there are. This problem is #P-complete [Valiant, 1979].)
Theorem 7 Given a voting protocolP , suppose that it is pos-
sible, for any bipartite graph B with the same number of ver-
tices k in both parts (labeled 1 to k in one part, k + 1 to 2k
in the other), to construct in polynomial time a set of votes
over the candidate set {c1, . . . , c2k, p} (where ci corresponds
to vertex i in B) with the following properties:
• (Property 2a) If we remove k of the ci, p would win an
election under protocolP against the remaining ci if and
only if the removed ci are exactly all the ci with k+1 ≤
i ≤ 2k;
• (Property 2b) p loses its pairwise election against all ci
with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k;
• (Property 2c) For any 1 ≤ i ≤ k and k+1 ≤ j ≤ 2k, ci
defeats cj in their pairwise election if and only if in B,
there is an edge between vertices i and j.
• (Property 2d) All the previous properties still hold with
any additional single vote.
Then CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION in RPRE + P is
#P-hard.
Proof: Given the set of votes constructed on the basis of an ar-
bitraryB, let us compute the probability that p wins under the
protocol RPRE + P with only these votes. In the preround,
there are k matches and one bye. By property 2a, p will win
the election if and only if the k candidates eliminated in this
preround are precisely all the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k. By
property 2b, p could not win a preround match against any of
these, so p will win the election if and only if it gets the bye,
and each of the cj with k+1 ≤ j ≤ 2k faces one of the ci with
1 ≤ i ≤ k that defeats it in the preround. Then, by property
4#P is the class of problems where the task is to count the number
of solutions to a problem in NP.
2c, it follows that p wins if and only if the preround pairing
corresponds to a matching in B. Thus the probability of p
winning is mB
e(2k,2k+1) , where mB is the number of matchings
in B and e(2k, 2k+1) is the number of different ways to pair
2k of the 2k+1 candidates in the preround (which is straight-
forward to compute). Thus, evaluating p’s chances of win-
ning in this election is at least as hard as counting the num-
ber of matchings in an arbitrary B, which is #P-hard. More-
over, because we can compute p’s chances of winning solely
on the basis of properties 2a, 2b, and 2c, and by property
2d, these properties are maintained for any single additional
vote, it follows that a manipulator cannot affect p’s chances
of winning. Thus, CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION in
this case simply comes down to computing p’s chances of
winning, which is #P-hard as demonstrated.
5.2 A broadly applicable reduction
In this subsection we present a single broadly applicable re-
duction which will satisfy the precondistions of Theorem 7
for many voting protocols, including all of the protocols dis-
cussed in this paper, thus proving them #P-hard to manipulate
when the voting precedes the preround scheduling.
Definition 3 We label the following reduction R1. Given a
bipartite graph B with the same number of vertices k in both
parts (labeled 1 to k in one part, k+1 to 2k in the other), we
construct the following set of 12k3 + 2k2 votes:
• 6k3 votes that rank the candidates ck+1 ≻ ck+2 ≻ . . . ≻
c2k ≻ p ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ ck;
• 3k2 votes that rank the candidates p ≻ ck ≻ ck−1 ≻
. . . ≻ c1 ≻ c2k ≻ c2k−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ck+1;
• 6k3 − 3k2 votes that rank the candidates ck ≻ ck−1 ≻
. . . ≻ c1 ≻ c2k ≻ c2k−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ck+1 ≻ p;
• For each edge (i, j) in B (1 ≤ i ≤ k, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k),
one vote that ranks the candidates ci ≻ cj ≻ p ≻ c1 ≻
c2 ≻ . . . ≻ ci−1 ≻ ci+1 ≻ . . . ≻ ck ≻ ck+1 ≻ ck+2 ≻
. . . ≻ cj−1 ≻ cj+1 ≻ . . . ≻ c2k, and another one that
ranks them c2k ≻ c2k−1 ≻ . . . ≻ cj+1 ≻ cj−1 ≻ . . . ≻
ck+1 ≻ ck ≻ ck−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ci+1 ≻ ci−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c1 ≻
p ≻ ci ≻ cj (i.e., the inverse of the former vote, apart
from ci and cj which have maintained their order);
• For each pair i, j without an edge between them in B
(1 ≤ i ≤ k, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k), one vote that ranks the
candidates cj ≻ ci ≻ p ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ ci−1 ≻
ci+1 ≻ . . . ≻ ck ≻ ck+1 ≻ ck+2 ≻ . . . ≻ cj−1 ≻
cj+1 ≻ . . . ≻ c2k, and another one that ranks them
c2k ≻ c2k−1 ≻ . . . ≻ cj+1 ≻ cj−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ck+1 ≻
ck ≻ ck−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ci+1 ≻ ci−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c1 ≻ p ≻
cj ≻ ci (i.e., the inverse of the former vote, apart from
cj and ci which have maintained their order).
We now have to show that this reduction satisfies the pre-
conditions of Theorem 7. We start with the properties that are
protocol-independent.
Theorem 8 R1 satisfies properties 2b and 2c of Theorem 7
(under any protocol P , because these properties are indepen-
dent of P ), even with a single additional arbitrary vote.
Proof: In the pairwise election between p and any one of the
ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, p is ranked higher in only 4k2
votes, and thus loses the pairwise election. So property 2b
is satisfied. For a pairwise election between some ci and cj
(1 ≤ i ≤ k and k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k), the first 12k3 votes’
net contribution to the outcome in this pairwise election is
0. Additionally, the two votes associated with any pair q, r
(1 ≤ q ≤ k and k+1 ≤ r ≤ 2k) also have a net contribution
of 0, if either q 6= i or r 6= j. The only remaining votes are
the two associated with the pair i, j, so ci wins the pairwise
election by 2 votes if there is an edge (i, j) in B, and cj wins
the pairwise election by 2 votes otherwise. So property 2c
is satisfied. Because both are satisfied with a ”margin” of at
least 2, a single additional vote will not change this.
Finally, because property 2a is protocol-dependent, we
need to prove it for our reduction on a per-protocol basis. This
is what the following four theorems achieve.
5.3 Examples
Theorem 9 R1 satisfies property 2a of Theorem 7 under the
Plurality protocol. This holds even when there is a single
additional arbitrary vote.
Proof: If at least one of the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k is not
removed, p can get at most 5k2 votes, whereas the lowest-
indexed remaining candidate among the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤
2k will get at least 6k3 votes, so p does not win. On the other
hand, if all the ci with k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k are removed, p will get
at least 6k3 + 3k2 votes, which is more than half the votes,
so p wins. In both cases there is a ”margin” of at least 2, so a
single additional vote will not change this.
Theorem 10 R1 satisfies property 2a of Theorem 7 under the
Borda protocol. This holds even when there is a single addi-
tional arbitrary vote.
Proof: If at least one of the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k is not
removed, consider the highest-indexed remaining candidate
among the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k; call it h. The first 12k3
votes will put h at least 9k3− 3k2 points ahead of p. (12k3−
3k2 of them rank h above p, and the 3k2 others can give p an
advantage of at most k each.) The 2k2 remaining votes can
contribute an advantage to p of at most k each, and it follows
that h will still have at least 7k3−3k2 more points than p. So
p does not win. On the other hand, if all the ci with k + 1 ≤
i ≤ 2k are removed, then there are two groups of 6k3 −
3k2 among the first 12k3 votes which (over the remaining
candidates) are each other’s exact inverses and hence have
no net effect on the scores. Also, the last 2k2 votes, which
are organized in pairs, have no net effect on the score because
(over the remaining candidates) the votes in each pair are each
other’s exact inverse. The remaining votes all rank p highest
among the remaining candidates, so p wins. In both cases the
“margin” is big enough that a single additional vote will not
change this.
Theorem 11 R1 satisfies property 2a of Theorem 7 under the
Maximin protocol. This holds even when there is a single
additional arbitrary vote.
Proof: If at least one of the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k is
not removed, then in any pairwise election between such a
candidate and p, p will get at most 5k2 votes. However, the
lowest-indexed remaining candidate among the ci with k +
1 ≤ i ≤ 2k will get at least 6k3 votes in every one of its
pairwise elections. So p does not win. On the other hand, if
all the ci with k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k are removed, p will get at least
6k3 + 3k2 votes in every one of its pairwise elections, which
is more than half the votes; so p wins. In both cases there is
a ”margin” of at least 2, so a single additional vote will not
change this.
Theorem 12 R1 satisfies property 2a of Theorem 7 under the
STV protocol. This holds even when there is a single addi-
tional arbitrary vote.
Proof: If at least one of the ci with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k is
not removed, consider the lowest-indexed remaining candi-
date among the ci with k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k; call it l. l will hold at
least 6k3 votes as long as it is not eliminated, and p can hold
at most 5k2 votes as long as l is not eliminated. It follows that
p will be eliminated before l, so p does not win. On the other
hand, if all the the ci with k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k are removed, p will
hold at least 6k3 + 3k2 votes throughout, which is more than
half the votes; so p cannot be eliminated and wins. In both
cases there is a ”margin” of at least 2, so a single additional
vote will not change this.
Theorem 13 In any of RPRE + Plurality, RPRE +
Borda, RPRE + Maximin, and RPRE + STV ,
CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is #P-hard.
Proof: Immediate from the previous theorems.
6 PSPACE-hardness when scheduling and
voting are interleaved
In this section, we increase the complexity of manipulation
one more notch, to PSPACE-hardness,5 by interleaving the
scheduling and vote elicitation processes.
We first discuss the precise method of interleaving required
for our result. The method is detailed and quite complicated.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the interleaving should
always take place in this particular way in order to have the
desired hardness. If the interleaving method used for a partic-
ular election is (say, randomly) chosen from a wider (and pos-
sibly more naturally expressed) class of interleaving methods
containing this one, our hardness result still goes through, as
hardness carries over from the specific to the general. Thus,
our goal is to find the most specific method of interleaving
for which the hardness still occurs, because this gives us the
most information about more general methods. We only de-
fine the method for the case where the number of candidates
is a multiple of 4 because this is the case that we will reduce
to (so it does not matter how we generalize the protocol to
cases where the number of candidates is not a multiple of 4).
Definition 4 IPRE proceeds as follows:
5PSPACE is the class of problems solvable in polynomial space.
1. Label the matchups (a matchup is a space in the pre-
round in which two candidates can face each other; at
this point they do not yet have candidates assigned to
them) 1 through |C|2 ;
2. For each matchup i, assign one of the candidates to play
in it, and denote this candidate by c(i, 1). Thus, one of
the candidates in each matchup is known.
3. For some k which is a multiple of 4, for each i with 1 ≤
i ≤ k, assign the second candidate to play in matchup i,
and denote this candidate c(i, 2). Thus, we have k fully
scheduled matchups.
4. For each pair of matchups (2i−1, 2i)with i > k2 , assign
two more candidates to face the candidates already in
these two matchups, and denote them c((2i − 1, 2i), 1)
and c((2i − 1, 2i), 2). (Thus, at this point, all that still
needs to be scheduled is, for each i, which of these two
faces c(2i− 1, 1) and which c(2i, 1).)
5. For i = k2 + 1 to
|C|
4 :
• Randomly decide which of c((2i−1, 2i), 1) and c((2i−
1, 2i), 2) faces c(2i−1, 1), and which faces c(2i, 1). De-
note the former c(2i− 1, 2), the latter c(2i, 2),
• Ask all the voters whether they prefer c(i − k2 , 1) or
c(i − k2 , 2). (We observe that, even if the number of al-
ready scheduled matchups is k = 0, the elicitation pro-
cess trails behind the scheduling process by a factor 2.)
6. Elicit the remainder of all the votes.
One important property of this elicitation process is that
the voters are treated symmetrically: when a query is made,
it is made to all of the voters in parallel. Thus, no voter
gets an unfair advantage with regard to knowledge about
the schedule. Another important property is that the elici-
tation and scheduling process at no point depends on how
the voters have answered earlier queries. Thus, voters cannot
make inferences about what other voters replied to previous
queries on the basis of the current query or the current knowl-
edge about the schedule. These two properties guarantee that
many issues of strategic voting that may occur with vote elic-
itation [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002b] in fact do not occur
here.
We are now ready to present our result.
Theorem 14 Given a voting protocol P , suppose that it is
possible, for any Boolean formula φ in conjunctive normal
form (i.e., a SAT instance) over variables V = X ∪ Y with
|X | = |Y | (and corresponding literals L), to construct in
polynomial time a set of votes over a candidate set containing
at least {p}∪CL∪{c1y : y ∈ Y }with the following properties:
• (Property 3a) If we remove, for each v ∈ V , one of
c+v and c−v, p would win an election under protocol P
against the remaining candidates if and only if for every
clause k ∈ K (where K is the set of clauses in φ), there
is some l ∈ L such that cl has not been removed, and l
occurs in k. This should hold even if a single arbitrary
vote is added.
• (Property 3b) For any x ∈ X , cx and c−x are tied in
their pairwise election after these votes.
• (Property 3c) For any y ∈ Y , cy and c−y are both losing
their pairwise elections against c1y by at least 2 votes (so
that they will lose them regardless of a single additional
vote).
Then CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION in IPRE + P is
PSPACE-hard (and PSPACE-complete if P can be executed
in polynomial space).
Proof: Consider the following election under IPRE+P . Let
the candidate set be the set of all candidates occurring in the
votes constructed from φ (the ”original candidates”), plus one
dummy candidate for each of the original candidates besides
the c+v and c−v. To each of the constructed votes, add all the
dummy candidates at the bottom; let the resulting set of votes
be the set of the nonmanipulators’ votes, according to which
they will answer the queries posed to them. The manipulator
has yet to decide on its strategy for answering queries. Af-
ter step 4 (according to Definition 4) of IPRE + P (up to
which point the manipulator will not have had to make any
decisions), let the situation be as follows:
• The number of already fully scheduled matchups is k =
|C|
2 −2|Y |. In matchup i (1 ≤ i ≤ |X |), c+xi faces c−xi .
In the remaining fully scheduled matchups, candidates
not corresponding to a literal face a dummy candidate.
• Matchups k + 2i − 1 and k + 2i (1 ≤ i ≤ |Y |) already
have candidates c+yi and c−yi in them, respectively. The
other two candidates to be assigned to these rounds are
c1yi and a dummy candidate.
Thus, what will happen from this point on is the following.
For i ranging from 1 to |X |, first the protocol will schedule
which of c+yi and c−yi face which of c1yi and the dummy
candidate. The cl facing the dummy will move on, and the
other will be defeated by c1yi , by property 3c. Second, every-
one will be asked which of c+xi and c−xi is preferred, and
because the nonmanipulators will leave this pairwise election
tied by property 3b, the manipulator’s vote will be decisive.
Thus, we can think of this as nature and the manipulator alter-
natingly giving the variables in Y and X respectively truth-
values: v is set to true if c+v survives, and to false if c−v
survives. By property 3a it then follows that p wins if and
only if the resulting assignment satisfies all the clauses, i.e. is
a solution to the SAT instance. Thus, the manipulator’s strat-
egy for setting variables should aim to maximize the chance
of the SAT instance being satisfied eventually. But this is
exactly the problem STOCHASTIC-SAT, which is PSPACE-
complete [Papadimitriou, 1985].
If P can be executed in polynomial space, the manipulator
can enumerate all possible outcomes for all possible strategies
in polynomial space, so the problem is also in PSPACE.
Because the preconditions of Theorem 14 are similar to
those of Theorem 1, we can build on our previous reductions
to apply this theorem to the well-known protocols.
Theorem 15 For each of Plurality, Borda, Maximin,
and STV , there exists a reduction that satisfies properties 3a,
3b and 3c of Theorem 14. Thus, In any of IPRE+Plurality,
IPRE +Borda, IPRE +Maximin, and IPRE + STV ,
CONSTRUCTIVE-MANIPULATION is PSPACE-complete.
Sketch of Proof: We can modify the reductions from Sec-
tion 4 to satisfy the preconditions of Theorem 14. This is
done by adding in the c1y in such a way as to achieve property
3c (ranking them just above their corresponding cy and c−y
in slightly more than half the votes), while preserving prop-
erty 3a (by ranking them as low as possible elsewhere).
7 Conclusions
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in mul-
tiagent systems, but seminal results have shown that all (non-
dictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try
to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where deter-
mining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. A
number of recent papers study the complexity of manipulat-
ing existing protocols.
This paper is the first work to take the next step of design-
ing new protocols that are especially difficult to manipulate.
Rather than designing these new protocols from scratch, we
instead showed how to tweak existing protocols to make ma-
nipulation hard, while leaving much of the original nature
of the protocol intact. The tweak studied in this paper con-
sists of adding one preround to the election, where candi-
dates face each other one against one. The surviving can-
didates continue to the original protocol. Surprisingly, this
extremely simple and universal tweak makes typical proto-
cols hard to manipulate! The protocols become NP-hard, #P-
hard, or PSPACE-hard to manipulate, depending on whether
the schedule of the preround is determined before the votes
are collected, after the votes are collected, or the schedul-
ing and the vote collecting are interleaved, respectively. We
proved general sufficient conditions on the protocols for this
tweak to introduce the hardness, and showed that the most
common voting protocols satisfy those conditions. These are
the first results in voting settings where manipulation is in a
higher complexity class than NP (presuming PSPACE 6= NP).
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